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Abstract
This paper presents a general approach for analysis and
verication of authentication properties in the language
of Communicating Sequential Processes CSP It is il
lustrated by an examination of the NeedhamSchroeder
publickey protocol The contribution of this paper is
to develop a specic theory appropriate to the analy
sis of authentication protocols built on top of the gen
eral CSP semantic framework This approach aims to
combine the ability to express such protocols in a natu
ral and precise way with the facility to reason formally
about the properties they exhibit
 Introduction
Authentication comes in a number of avours For ex
ample Gollmann  has identi	ed four di
erent va
rieties of authentication which raises the question for
any particular authentication protocol as to which kind
of authentication the protocol was designed for and
which kinds it actually provides
The aim of the CSP approach is to reduce questions
about security protocols and properties to questions
concerning whether CSP processes satisfy particular
CSP speci	cations This approach forces the separa
tion of properties and protocols and allows discussion
of what is meant by particular kinds of security prop
erty independently of the protocols that are intended to
achieve them The formal analysis will then be entirely
within the CSP framework which allows the possibil
ity of veri	cation of protocols with respect to the CSP
properties
The general CSP framework proposed by this author
has been described in  That paper is concerned
with the theoretical foundations It o
ers de	nitions
of security properties including authentication This
means that since a CSP description of a protocol has a
precisely de	ned semantics it is a precise mathematical
question as to whether the protocol meets the property
or not However the practicalities of how such a veri
	cation might be carried out were not addressed that
is the purpose of this paper
The approach taken here is 	rstly to express the pro
tocol in CSP The authentication property we consider
states that if some events R in the system are re
stricted then other events T should not occur We
establish this by de	ning a suitable predicate on mes
sages which shows that only particular messages can
circulate in the restricted system and hence that mes
sages from T are not possible
CSP is particularly suitable for describing protocols
close to the level we think of them In other contexts
the argument for authentication essentially amounts to
an unreachability analysis or a proof that a particular
word is not in a language The strength of this ap
proach is that there is a formal link between the argu
ment and a natural description of the protocol Formal
isation of the protocol into CSP also exposes issues and
forces design decisions that may not have been explicit
in the original abstract protocol description The for
malisation of the required authentication property like
wise forces consideration of what precisely is meant
by authentication It is useful to know which precise
CSP properties the protocol does indeed guarantee
and which it does not
One of the strengths of CSP is the ease with which
specialised theories can be constructed on top of the
semantic models This allows particular speci	cation
statements to be de	ned in terms of the standard
semantics and new proof rules appropriate to these
speci	cations to be provided This approach is taken
here where we specify and reason about authentication
properties and also about agents inability to generate
particular messages Although standard proof rules
would support the veri	cation since they are sound
and complete it is preferable to develop a specialised
theory since it provides an appropriate level of abstrac
tion for supporting the kind of reasoning we require
For reasons of space this paper will not present details
of the CSP proof system and CSP algebraic identities
which underpin the results They are given in a fuller
version  of this paper
 The NeedhamSchroeder PublicKey
Protocol
The NeedhamSchroeder publickey protocol aims to
achieve authentication of each of its participants to the
other It makes use of public key cryptography where
each participant has a public key which is available to
everybody and a private key known to noone else
Any message encrypted with a public key requires the
corresponding secret key in order to decrypt it
The original version of the protocol  assumed that
the participants did not know each others public key
and so each engaged in a message exchange with a
trusted server in order to obtain it If the participants
do begin by knowing the public keys then the protocol
may be distilled to three messages as described in 
as below We will refer to it in this paper as NS
A  B  p
B
n
A
 A
B   A  p
A
n
A
 n
B

A  B  p
B
n
B

The participants of the protocol are A and B  their
public keys are p
A
and p
B
respectively and each gen
erates one nonce n
A
and n
B
respectively
An informal explanation of the design of the protocol
might run as follows A sends a nonce n
A
to B  en
crypted with B s public key When A later receives
a message containing the nonce n
A
 she knows that
B must have generated it since only B could decrypt
the 	rst message and thus obtain the nonce n
A
 so B s
identity is authenticated to A Similarly B sent out
a nonce encrypted with As public key so the 	nal
message received by B  containing the nonce n
B
 must
have been generated by A because only A could have
decrypted the message that B sent out Thus A is au
thenticated to B  and the two participants know that
they are talking to each other
In  Lowe describes an unexpected execution of the
protocol discovered using modelchecking techniques
on a CSP description of a network running the proto
col In this run B receives authentication that he is
talking to A but A is in fact talking to an intruder I 
who she believes to be honest The execution is de
scribed as follows where I A denotes the intruder I
masquerading as A in other words generating mes
sages which appear to have been sent from A and in
tercepting messages destined for A
A  I  p
i
n
A
 A
I A  B  p
B
n
A
 A
B   I A  p
A
n
A
 n
B

I   A  p
A
n
A
 n
B

A  I  p
i
n
B

I A  B  p
B
n
B

B s response to the nonce challenge is to A but there is
nothing in that message to indicate that the response
indeed originated from B  The intruder I is therefore
able to pass it o
 as a nonce challenge that I has issued
and so I receives the response from A which is then
passed to B 
Authentication normally requires that each agent must
at least assume that the other is honest and will cor
rectly follow the steps of the protocol Note that in this
attack A is indeed acting honestly though her judge
ment concerning I s honesty is questionable
Lowes x
Lowe observed that the above sequence of messages can
be prevented by including the identity of the responder
in the second message to identify its originator and
ensuring that this is checked The resulting protocol
is described below We will refer to it in this paper as
NS
A  B  p
B
n
A
 A
B   A  p
A
n
A
 n
B
 B
A  B  p
B
n
B

Lowe observed that the modelchecking techniques
used to 	nd the earlier aw found no aw with this
protocol Furthermore he o
ered a proof that any at
tack on the protocol as a whole would also be an attack
on the necessarily 	nite CSP description that had been
modelchecked Since no such attack had been found
there could be no attack on the protocol The proof
considered the nature of any possible sequence of mes
sages embodying an attack
This paper aims at a more direct method of veri	ca
tion in which a CSP description of the protocol in
a hostile environment is shown to meet particular au
thentication properties The proof provides insight into
why the design of the protocol is correct
The protocol NS is used as an example running
through the paper For the purposes of illustrating the
approach we 	rst consider a single run of the protocol
where both participants know their roles in advance
having worked through the approach with this exam
ple we will 	nally show how the approach generalises
to multiple interleaved runs of the protocol between
many di
erent agents
Section  introduces the aspects of the language and
theory of Communicating Sequential Processes CSP
appropriate to this paper Section  constructs a CSP
model for analysing authentication protocols and de
scribes NS in CSP Section  introduces the CSP ap
proach to de	ning authentication properties and con
siders the properties that might be required of NS
Section  describes a theory for verifying authenti
cation protocols against particular authentication re
quirements Section  carries out the veri	cation for
NS Section  discusses the generalisation of the anal
ysis to consider the case of multiple concurrent runs of
the protocol Section  briey discusses how the alge
braic properties of cryptomechanisms might be incor
porated within the analysis We end with a discussion
in Section 
 CSP
CSP is an abstract language designed speci	cally for
the description of communication patterns of concur
rent system components that interact through message
passing It is underpinned by a theory which supports
analysis of systems described in CSP It is therefore
well suited to the description and analysis of network
protocols protocols can be described within CSP as
can the relevant aspects of the network Their interac
tions can be investigated and certain aspects of their
behaviour can be veri	ed through use of the theory
This section introduces the notation and ideas used in
this paper In particular only the traces model for CSP
is used here For a fuller introduction to the language
the reader is referred to 
Events
Systems are modelled in terms of the events that they
can perform The set of all possible events 	xed at
the beginning of the analysis is denoted  Events
may be atomic in structure or may consist of a number
of distinct components For example an event put  
consists of two parts a channel name put  and a data
value  An example of events used in this paper are
those of the form c i  j  m consisting of a channel c
a source i  a destination j and a message m If M
and N are sets of messages then M  N will be the set
of messages fm n j m  M  n  N g If m is a
single message then we elide the set brackets and de	ne
m N to be fmg N  Thus for example the set of events
i  N  m  fi  n m j n  N g A channel c is said to be of
type M if any message c m   has that m M 
Processes
Processes are the components of systems They are
the entities that are described using CSP and they are
described in terms of the possible events that they may
engage in The process Stop is the process that can
engage in no events at all it is equivalent to deadlock
The output cv   P is able initially to perform only
c v  the output of v on channel c after which it behaves
as P  The input cx  T   Px  can accept any input
x of type T along channel c following which it behaves
as Px  Its 	rst event will be any event of the form
c t where t  T  The process P   Q pronounced P
choice Q  can behave either as P or as Q  its possible
communications are those of P and those of Q  An
indexed form of choice
 
i I
P
i
is able to behave as
any of its arguments P
i

Processes may also be composed in parallel If D is a
set of events then the process P jD jQ behaves as P
and Q acting concurrently with the requirement that
they have to synchronise on any event in the synchro
nisation set D  events not in D may be performed by
either process independently of the other A special
form of parallel operator in which the two components
do not interact on any events is P jjj Q which is equiv
alent to P j fg jQ 
Processes may be recursively de	ned by means of equa
tional de	nitions Process names must appear on the
left hand side of such de	nitions and CSP expressions
which may include those names appear on the right
hand side For example the de	nition
LIGHT  on   o   LIGHT
de	nes a process LIGHT whose only possible be
haviour is to perform on and o alternately
Mutually recursive processes may also be de	ned
where a possibly in	nite collection of process names
X k appear on the left hand side of de	nitions and
CSP expressions F k involving any of those names
appear on the right For example the set of de	nitions
COUNT  b up   COUNT 
COUNT n   b up   COUNT n  
  down   COUNT n
de	ne a collection of processes COUNT  can do any
number of up and down events but can never do more
downs than ups
For a full discussion of single and mutually recursive
process de	nitions see 
Traces
The semantics of a process P is de	ned to be the set
of sequences of events tracesP that it may pos
sibly perform Examples of traces include hi the
empty trace which is possible for any process and
hon o  oni which is a possible trace of LIGHT  The
traces model for CSP  gives a formal de	nition of the
set of traces associated with each CSP process Every
process is associated with some nonempty prexclosed
set of traces if tr
 
a
tr

is a possible trace then so is
tr
 

A useful operator on traces is projection If D is a set
of events then the trace tr  D is de	ned to be the max
imal subsequence of tr all of whose events are drawn
from D  If D is a singleton set fdg then we overload
notation and write tr  d for tr  fdg Message ex
traction tr  C for a set of channel names C provides
the maximal sequence of messages passed on channels
C  Finally tr  C provides the set of messages in tr
passed along some channel in C 
If tr is a sequence then tr is the set of events ap
pearing in the sequence The operator  extends to
processes P is the set of events that appear in some
trace of P 
Specication
Speci	cations are given as predicates on traces and a
process P satis	es a speci	cation S if all of its traces
satisfy S 
P sat S   tr  tracesP S
For example the speci	cation which states that event
a must occur before event b might be captured with
the predicate
 tr
 
 tr

 tr  tr
 
a
hbi
a
tr

 tr
 
 a 	 hi
The fact that tracesP is always pre	xclosed allows
a simpler speci	cation
tr  b 	 hi  tr  a 	 hi
This states that if b occurs somewhere in the trace
then so does a Since a process satisfying this speci
	cation must have all of its traces meeting the predi
cate this means that a must occur before b since if b
occurred 	rst in some trace tr then a pre	x of tr con
taining b but not a would fail to meet the predicate
 The CSP model
The approach taken to modelling and analysing secu
rity protocols is to provide a CSP description of the
DolevYao model  Here it is assumed that the com
munications medium is entirely under the control of
the enemy which can block readdress duplicate and
fake messages We will de	ne a generates relation 

which describes when new messages may be derived
from existing ones S 
 m means that knowledge of
all the messages in S is sucient to produce m This
will be used to capture the enemys ability to fake mes
sages In  the roles of the passive medium and of
the active enemy were described using distinct CSP
processes which enabled the capabilities of the enemy
to be separately described For the purposes of this
paper it is preferable to describe the combination of
the enemy and the medium as a single CSP process
ENEMY  since this makes for an easier analysis
There is a set USER consisting of the names of all the
agents which use the network For each i  USER we
associate a process USER
i
which describes how user
i behaves Each process USER
i
communicates with
ENEMY by means of a channel trans i on which it
transmits messages and a channel rec i on which it
receives messages Thus we have USER
i
  trans i
rec i 
The resulting network is then described as follows
NET  
jjj
j USER
USER
j
 j trans rec jENEMY
This network is pictured in Figure 
In the analysis of a protocol we might consider A and B
as the two parties involved in the protocol and USER
A
and USER
B
will describe the respective roles that they
play
If there are actually no other users connected to the
system then we can have USER
i
 Stop for each i 	
AB and we obtain
NET  USER
A
jjj USER
B
 j trans rec jENEMY
We retain the names of other users in the set USER to
retain the potential of the ENEMY to masquerade as
a di
erent user
USER USER USER...A
ENEMY
trans.A
rec.A
trans.B
rec.B
trans.M
rec.M
MB
Figure 1. CSP model of the network
The channels trans and rec are of type
USER USER MESSAGE  A message trans i  j  m
should be thought of as node i sending a message
m with destination j  Thus i is the source j the
destination and m the message The message space
MESSAGE will generally be de	ned as an abstract
data type
Message space
The message space we use for analysis of this protocol
is as follows
RAW  USER j TEXT j NONCE j KEY
MESSAGE  RAW j KEY MESSAGE 
jMESSAGE  MESSAGE
In fact for this example using public key cryptography
the space KEY will split into public keys PUBLIC
and secret keys SECRET  one of each for each user in
USER
KEY  PUBLIC j SECRET
We have rules concerning the way messages may be
generated from existing ones This set of rules de	nes
the generates relation 

A If m  S then S 
 m
A If S 
 m and S  S

then S


 m
A If S 
 m
i
for each m
i
 S

and S


 m then S 
 m
M S 
 m  S 
 k  S 
 km
M S 
 m
 
 S 
 m

 S 
 m
 
 m

K fp
i
s
i
mg 
 m
K fs
i
p
i
mg 
 m
Description of ENEMY
A natural CSP description of the DolevYao model sep
arates out an essentially passive medium MEDIUM
from an intruder INTRUDER which is able to read
messages from the medium via channel leak and to
manipulate it by removing and adding messages via
channels kill and add This approach was taken in
 and allows explicit modeling of the enemy ac
tions However for veri	cation purposes an equivalent
description will be easier to use in proofs
ENEMY S   
transijm   ENEMY S  fmg
 
 
i j USER Sm
rec i j m   ENEMY S 
This process has exactly the same traces as the com
bination of MEDIUM and INTRUDER It reads all
messages output by any of the users on any of the
channels trans and it can pass on any message which it
can generate to any user which allows for honest mes
sage passing redirecting messages replaying messages
and inventing new messages Furthermore since all of
these options are possibilities rather than imperatives
it is also possible that messages will be blocked simply
by the enemy not exercising the option of passing them
on
The set S contains messages which the enemy knows
about every time a new message is put out by some
user the set S is augmented There will be a set INIT
consisting of the enemys initial knowledge this may
contain items such as users names public keys and
some nonces which the enemy may use
ENEMY  ENEMY INIT 
The agents implementing the protocols place restric
tions on the messages that may be passed on trans
which in turn restricts the possibilities for messages
being passed on rec
We are already in a position to prove that all messages
passed on rec must be generable from the initial set
INIT together with the messages input on trans
Theorem 
ENEMY sat INIT  tr  trans 
 tr  rec
 
Protocol participants
The agents A and B that are the participants in the
protocol are modelled as USER
A
and USER
B
 consist
ing of CSP implementations of the two halves of the
protocol Obviously these will vary depending on the
protocol being modelled More generally if there are
other participants such as trusted third parties then
their activity will also be described as CSP processes
For the purposes of illustrating the CSP approach we
simplify the analysis by considering up to Section 
only the case where A is the initiator and knows that
she is and B is the responder and knows that he is
This description therefore does not allow for attacks
where both parties act as initiators or as senders This
assumption will be relaxed in Section  where each
party can independently play either role
User A is described by the process USER
A

USER
A
  
i USER
trans Ai p
i
n
A
 A 
rec A ip
A
n
A
 x  i 
trans Ai p
i
x   Stop
This process allows a user i to be chosen and the
	rst communication trans Ai p
i
n
A
 A sends out the
encrypted nonce challenge p
i
n
A
 A on As transmit
channel trans A with intended destination i  Since
the enemy can interfere with the source and destination
	elds of messages the use of the third 	led in messages
is simply to track information concerning the intentions
or expectations of the participants in the protocol In
this case it tracks the fact that user A believes she is
running the protocol with i 
The second communication is one of the form
rec A ip
A
n
A
 x  i This appears on As receive chan
nel rec A apparently from source i  The form of the
message p
A
n
A
 x  i indicates that the process will only
accept an input which is encrypted by p
A
 whose 	rst
nonce is n
A
 and whose included user identity is i  but
that x can be any nonce The use of pattern matching
on message input corresponds to the assumption that
any message that fails to match the pattern would be
ignored though we are modelling this as blocking re
ceipt rather than accepting and throwing it away the
USER
i
processes simply do not engage in any message
which does not match the pattern In practice this is
unlikely to be achievable especially in cases where an
agent must decrypt a message before 	nding out if it
is of a particular form However it does not a
ect the
ability of the enemy to attack protocols described in
this way
Typing of messages is also implicit in pattern matching
The type of the channel determines the range of possi
ble messages that might match the pattern The range
of permissible inputs for rec A i  p
A
n
A
 x  i depends on
the type of x  A correct run of the protocol would have
x as a nonce but without the ability to type messages
the input could accept an arbitrary message for x  For
the purposes of this paper we will assume that inputs
de	ned by pattern matching must also conform to the
expected type This amounts to assuming that it is not
possible for a message of one type to be mistaken for a
message of another type This typing assumption can
be relaxed within our framework though it makes the
veri	cation more dicult since there are more general
cases to consider
The 	nal communication trans Ai p
i
x  consists of the
response to the nonce challenge x 
The behaviour of the other protocol participant is de
scribed in CSP by the process USER
B

USER
B
 rec Bj p
B
y  j  
trans B j p
j
y  n
B
 B 
rec B  j  p
B
n
B
  Stop
The 	rst message rec Bjp
B
y  j  allows input of any
message along B s receive channel which is encrypted
with B s secret key The apparent source j should
match the source j given in the message and y can
be any nonce Pattern matching is used again here
The second message trans B j p
j
y  n
B
 B describes
B s response to the 	rst message The required re
sponse is the nonce y together with B s nonce challenge
n
B
 and B s name B  all encrypted with the public key
of the originator of the 	rst message
Finally the third message that is expected is a response
with apparent source j to the nonce challenge n
B
 The
only possibility is p
B
n
B
 so all other inputs will be
blocked ignored
 Authentication properties
A messageoriented approach to authentication is dis
cussed in  Authentication considers a set of mes
sages T to authenticate another set of messages R if
occurrence of some element of T must have been ac
companied in P by occurrence of some element of R
The sets T and R are taken to be disjoint The trace
speci	cation may be captured as follows
Denition 
T authenticates R  tr  R  hi  tr  T  hi
 
The following lemmas are an immediate consequence
of the de	nition
Lemma 
P sat T authenticates R 
P jR jStop sat tr  T  hi
 
Lemma 	 if P sat T authenticates R and R  R

then P sat T authenticates R
 
 
Flavours of origin authentication property
The treatment of authentication in terms of sets of mes
sages allows for extremely 	negrained distinctions to
be made between di
erent avours of authentication
property
Even if we restrict the authenticating message to be
USER
B
s last one rec B  A p
B
n
B
 then there are a
number of possibilities as to what this message might
authenticate
 Authenticating !trans A B  p
B
n
A
 A" corre
sponds to the requirement that occurrence of
B s 	nal message guarantees that A initiated the
protocol run with B  with the nonce n
A

 Authenticating !trans A B  p
B
NONCE  A" cor
responds to the requirement that on occurrence
of B s last message it is guaranteed that A initi
ated the protocol run with B  but possibly with
a di
erent nonce Lemma  yields that this is
implied by property 
 !ftrans A j  p
j
NONCE  A j j  USERg" being
authenticated corresponds to the requirement that
on occurrence of B s last message it is guaranteed
that A initiated a protocol run but possibly with
a di
erent user and nonce Lemma  yields
that this is implied by property  and hence by
property 
 Authenticating !rec A USER p
A
NONCE  n
B
 B"
con	rms that A received B s nonce challenge and
that A initiated the run with B as shown by the
name contained in the second message
 !rec A USER p
A
NONCE  n
B
 USER" being au
thenticated con	rms only that A received B s
nonce challenge It does not con	rm that A initi
ated the run with B 
 Authenticating !trans A B  p
B
n
B
" con	rms that
A responded to B s nonce challenge
 Authenticating !trans A B  p
B
NONCE " au
thenticates that A responded to some challenge
believed to come from B  but not necessarily
with the nonce that B issued It follows from
Lemma  that this is implied by property 
 Authenticating !ftrans A j  p
j
n
B
 j j  USERg"
authenticates that A responded to B s nonce chal
lenge but does not necessarily associate it with B 
It follows from Lemma  that this is also implied
by property 
 !ftrans A j  p
j
NONCE  j j  USERg" being au
thenticated con	rms only that A responded to
some nonce challenge#in other words it veri	es
that A is live It follows from Lemma  that
this is implied by property  and hence by prop
erty 
Property  is one of the strongest properties and is
the one that is most appropriate to prove for user B 
that if he reaches the end of the protocol then A also
reached the end of the protocol and responded to the
nonce challenge n
B
 and believed she was talking to B 
The original protocol NS fails to meet this property
though it does meet the weaker Property  a proof is
provided in 
 Veri	cation
We obtain an extremely specialised theorem that ap
plies to authentication properties on this speci	c de
scription NET of the network This theorem is at the
heart of the proof strategy presented in this paper It
provides a sucient list of conditions whose achieve
ment guarantees that NET sat T authenticates R
Theorem 
 If I is a predicate on messages such
that
C m  INIT  I m
C m

 S  I m

  S 
 m  I m
C m  T  I m
C  i  USER
i
jR jStop sat maintains I 
then NET jR jStop sat tr  T  hi  
The predicate I is intended to hold of all messages
which can be generated by some agent including the
enemy during a run of the protocol when all messages
in the set R are prevented from occurring The inten
tion is to show that this restriction on R means that
no event from T can occur Conditions C and C
together mean that if the enemy only ever sees mes
sages which satisfy I  then he can only ever generate
messages which satisfy I 
Condition C states that the same is true for the users
of the network when restricted on R they never
output a message that does not satisfy I unless they
previously received such a message The speci	cation
maintains I is de	ned as
maintains I tr b
m  tr  rec  I m
 m  tr  trans  I m
If every message received on rec meets I  then every
message sent out on trans also meets I 
The predicate I can therefore be seen as describing an
invariant at every stage of the protocols execution
when R is restricted I must hold of the next message
Since C states that I does not hold for any message
in T  this means that no message in T can ever be
generated if R is restricted which in turn means that
T authenticates R by Lemma 
The problem for any particular protocol and a par
ticular authentication property expressed in terms of
R and T  is to 	nd an appropriate invariant I which
makes C to C all true
Rank functions
A previous approach  introduced a rank function 
on messages which captured their level of encryption
Only messages of positive rank were to circulate in the
system In this setting the invariant I m was taken to
be m   The rank function was used to de	ne the
invariant I below but Theorem  is here presented in
terms of I rather than  in order to provide a sharper
description of the role played by the predicate In many
cases it may well be easier to de	ne I in terms of a rank
function though this requires further investigation

 Veri	cation of Property 
The authentication property  states that
!rec B  A p
B
 n
B
 authenticates trans A B  p
B
 n
B
"
which con	rms that A responded to B s nonce
challenge
An appropriate predicate for veri	cation of NS with
respect to this property is the following It is dependent
on the descriptions USER
A
and USER
B
 and on the
property to be veri	ed
It has been de	ned by structural induction on the def
inition of the message space
I m
m  USER
 m  TEXT
 m  NONCE  m 	 n
B
 m  SECRET  m 	 s
A
 m 	 s
B
 m  PUBLIC
 m

 MESSAGE  k  PUBLIC  
m  km

 
k  p
A
 m

 NONCE  n
B
 B  I m


 m

 MESSAGE  k  SECRET  
m  km

 
k  s
A
 m

 p
A
NONCE  n
B
 B  I m


 m
 
m

MESSAGE  
m  m
 
 m

 I m
 
  I m


We must show that C$C of Theorem  are satis
	ed by this invariant in order for the theorem to be
applicable
C
The condition C really amounts to an assumption on
the initial information available to the enemy The
requirement that m  INIT  I m states that the en
emy is unable to generate B s nonce and that he is not
in possession of either As or B s secret key This does
not require a proof but rather formalises the assump
tion we are making
C
Condition C  m

 S  I m

  S 
 m  I m is
a requirement on the interaction between the relation

 and the predicate It may be proven inductively by
considering each of the clauses de	ning 
 in turn
For example consider the clause M   S 
 m  S 

k  S 
 km If m

 S  I m

 then by the inductive
assumption C we have I m and I k There are two
possibilities for k  a public key or a secret key If k is
a public key p
j
then the fact that I m holds means
that I km holds as required If k is a secret key
s
j
then j 	 A since I s
j
 but I s
A
 and so again
I m implies I s
j
m This establishes the inductive
step for M 
C	
Condition C  m  T  I t must be checked in
this case for the single message that constitutes T#
p
B
n
B
 Since I n
B
 it follows from the de	nition of
I that I p
B
n
B

C
Finally condition C must be checked for USER
A
and
USER
B
 This means that neither USER
A
nor USER
B

when restricted on trans A B  p
B
n
B
 can introduce
any messages which do not satisfy I  We use RUSER
A
and RUSER
B
to refer to USER
A
and USER
B
respec
tively restricted on this event
We 	rst consider USER
A
 The rules of CSP allow the
restricted process RUSER
A
to be rewritten to a se
quential process as follows
RUSER
A

USER
A
j trans A B  p
B
n
B
 j Stop 
 
i USER
trans Ai p
i
n
A
 A 
rec A ip
A
n
A
 x  i 

Stop if i  b  x  n
B
trans Ai p
i
x   Stop if i 	 b  x 	 n
B
There are proof rules for CSP presented in 
which allow a formal proof that this process satis	es
maintains I  Here we will present an informal argu
ment by considering the messages that RUSER
A
sends
and receives We must prove that if every message re
ceived by the process meets the predicate I  then ev
ery message sent out by it also does so We proceed
by establishing that no message sent out by RUSER
A
violates this requirement
The 	rst message that is sent out is p
i
n
A
 A for some
i  The de	nition of I yields that I p
i
n
A
 A so the
	rst message sent out by RUSER
A
does not violate our
requirement
A message p
A
n
A
 x  i is then received If this does
not satisfy I  then RUSER
A
cannot violate the re
quirement since the requirement is appropriate only
when USER
A
receives messages that all meet I  Hence
we need only consider the case where I p
A
n
A
 x  i
From the de	nition of I in this case either n
A
 x  i 
NONCE  n
B
 B  or I n
A
 x  i This disjunction implies
that either x  n
B
and i  b or else I x  In the 	rst
case the restricted USER
A
sends out no further mes
sages so cannot violate the requirement In the second
case the restricted user sends out p
i
x  and since I x 
it follows that I p
i
x  so again the requirement is not
violated This completes the proof
We now turn our attention to USER
B

The restricting event trans A B  p
B
n
B
 does not inter
sect with the events that USER
B
performs so USER
B
itself is the process to consider to establish C for B 
We are concerned with runs of USER
B
which lead to
the authenticating event rec B  A p
B
n
B
 so we are
only concerned with those runs which have A as the
apparent origin of the 	rst message#any other agent
identity in the 	rst message cannot lead to the occur
rence of rec B  A p
B
n
B

The de	nition we are thus concerned with is
USER
ba
 rec B  Ap
B
y  A 
trans B ap
A
y  n
B
 B 
rec B  A p
B
n
B
  Stop
The argument we make is similar to the case for
RUSER
A
 The 	rst message is receipt of p
B
y  j  If
I p
B
y  j  then the requirement is vacuously met so
we have only to consider the case where I p
B
y  j 
The de	nition of I yields that I y
The second message is a transmission of p
A
y  n
B
 B
where y is the nonce received in the 	rst message
The de	nition of I ensures that this message meets
I  The 	nal message is receipt of another message so
cannot violate the requirement maintains I  Hence
USER
ba
sat maintains I as required
A nal step
Technically the restriction of the analysis of USER
B
to the case where the initiating agent is A means that
the theorem has proven that
USER
A
jjj USER
ba
 j trans rec jENEMY sat
rec B  A p
B
 n
B
 authenticates trans A B  p
B
 n
B

Here we give the technical justi	cation that this restric
tion is justi	ed
Any system which is unable ever to perform the
event rec B  A p
B
n
B
 also meets the speci	cation
rec B  A p
B
 n
B
 authenticates trans A B  p
B
 n
B
 vacu
ously The run of USER
B
with a particular agent j
may be described as
USER
bj
 rec B  jp
B
y  A 
trans B j p
j
y  n
B
 B 
rec B  j  p
B
n
B
  Stop
and then USER
B
 
j USER
USER
bj
describes
USER
B
as the choice of runs over all users This
description is equivalent to the original one given for
USER
B
 since an input of j is semantically identical to
a choice over all j 
If j 	 a then the fact that USER
bj
is unable to per
form rec B  A p
B
n
B
 means that its composition with
USER
A
and ENEMY is also unable to do so and hence
that the authentication property holds vacuously
USER
A
jjj USER
bj
 j trans rec jENEMY sat
rec B  A p
B
 n
B
 authenticates trans A B  p
B
 n
B

The reasoning above for USER
ba
has already estab
lished that this holds for the case where j  a
The choice operator preserves speci	cations if all pro
cesses meet a speci	cation then so does the process
consisting of the choice between them This means
that
 
j USER
USER
A
jjj USER
bj
 j trans rec jENEMY
sat
rec B  A p
B
 n
B
 authenticates trans A B  p
B
 n
B

Finally we make use of the fact that both forms of
parallel composition distribute over choice to obtain
USER
A
jjj 
 
j USER
USER
bj
 j trans rec jENEMY
sat
rec B  A p
B
 n
B
 authenticates trans A B  p
B
 n
B

or in other words
NET sat
rec B  A p
B
 n
B
 authenticates trans A B  p
B
 n
B

as required
 Multiple runs
All the analysis performed above has been on a system
where there is but a single run of the protocol between
A and B  and where A and B take the roles of initiator
and responder respectively While it is possible infor
mally to generalise the veri	cations to systems with
repeated runs of the protocol it is also possible to de
scribe in CSP the situation where agents perform mul
tiple runs of the protocol and hence provide a formal
veri	cation Analysis of a single run allows attention
to be focussed on the two participants of the run In
the case where we have multiple runs it is appropri
ate to model the two parties as able to engage in their
other runs with any other parties and restrict their be
haviour only for the protocol run under analysis This
is the approach that we shall take
One issue to be addressed concerns the requirement to
use a fresh nonce on every protocol run This may
be modelled in CSP by using an in	nite sequence of
nonces where n
A k
and n
B k
are used on the kth run
of A and B respectively The kth run of the protocol
will be de	ned in terms of what occurs during that run
and when the k  th run can commence
The most general situation allows an agent to take the
role of initiator or of responder independently in each
run These possibilities are captured in the descrip
tion of a user by allowing the l  th run to begin at
any point after the start of the lth run In particular
USER
i
l describes user i at the point where the lth
run of the protocol is ready to be executed As soon
as it begins the description enables the l  th run to
execute concurrently with run l and any earlier runs
which are still proceeding
The processes USER
A
k are described as follows
USER
A
k 
 
i USER
trans Ai p
i
n
A k
 A 


rec A ip
A
n
A k
 x  i 
trans Ai p
i
x   Stop
jjj USER
A
k  

A
  rec Ajp
A
y  j  


trans Aj p
j
y  n
A k
 A 
rec A j  p
A
n
A k
  Stop
jjj USER
A
k  

A
The possibilities for USER
A
k are as follows
 to transmit a message of the form
trans A i  p
i
n
A k
 A corresponding to USER
A
initiating a run of the protocol The behaviour
subsequent to this message is the rest of the mes
sages appropriate to the protocol run together
with the possibilities of USER
A
k   that the
next protocol run will begin
 to receive a message of the form rec A j  p
A
y  j 
purporting to be a message from j initiating a pro
tocol run with A The subsequent behaviour is to
continue through the protocol run while also of
fering the possibility to begin the next protocol
run
We de	ne USER
A
 USER
A
 the user begins in a
state where no runs have been performed
The description of user USER
B
is exactly that of
USER
A
with occurrences of the name A replaced by
occurrences of the name B 
The appropriate version of Property  for this descrip
tion is the requirement that rec B  A p
B
n
B  k
 authen
ticates trans A B  p
B
n
B  k
 for any given k 
Theorem  is applicable for any descriptions of
USER
A
and USER
B
 including recursive ones If
we use the same predicate I as was previously given
with n
B k
replacing n
B
in the de	nition then
we have already established that conditions C$C
are met and we have only to establish C that
USER
i
j trans A B  p
B
n
B k
 jStop sat maintains I
for i  a and i  b
The CSP proof rule for recursive de	nitions allows
a proof to proceed which has a structure similar
to the proof for the single run given above The
proof rule states that if a recursive de	nition can
be shown to preserve a speci	cation then the recur
sively de	ned process meets that speci	cation In
the case we are considering we wish to show that
RUSER
A
l sat maintains I  where RUSER
A
l is
USER
A
l restricted on trans A B  p
B
n
B  k
 each pro
cess RUSER
A
l is de	ned in terms of RUSER
A
l
The rule states that if for each l  under the assumption
that RUSER
A
l sat maintains I it is possible to
show that RUSER
A
l sat maintains I  then we may
deduce that RUSER
A
l sat maintains I for each l 
The assumption that RUSER
A
l   sat
maintains I means that when RUSER
A
l is
analysed it is only the messages that the lth protocol
run itself can introduce which need to be considered
the assumption on RUSER
A
l   means that we
already assume that no subsequent runs will violate
the requirement
The analysis of the messages in the lth protocol run is
entirely similar to the analysis already carried out on
the single run of the protocol presented above and does
not need to be reproduced here The main di
erence is
the requirement to incorporate an extra case analysis
of k  l and k 	 l 
 Equations
We might also wish to allow for equations on the mes
sage space Some natural ones would be those describ
ing the relationship between encryption and decryp
tion
E p
i
s
i
m  s
i
p
i
m  m
This would remove the need for K and K in the
de	nition of the generates relation since they reduce
under the equality to fmg 
 m which is already covered
by A
There would also be properties such as associativity of
concatenation
E m
 
 m

 m

  m
 
 m

 m

Equations could also capture possible properties of en
cryption mechanisms For example encryption dis
tributing over catenation would be quite a signi	cant
weakness
E km
 
 m

  km
 
 km


Such equations can be imposed on the message space
but in general their presence might allow additional
attacks on protocols It is useful to understand con
ditions under which a proof of a protocols correctness
remains valid in the face of such equations
In fact the only impact the introduction of an equation
has on a proof is that it may make the predicate I ill
de	ned Since I is often de	ned structurally over the
message space it is possible that two di
erent ways of
constructing the same message m may correspond to
contradictory values for I m It is necessary to check
that this possibility has not arisen in order for the proof
to remain valid
To check that the invariant I is wellde	ned it is nec
essary to check that if m
 
 m

then I m
 
  I m


for any equations given This states that I respects the
relevant equations
Of the three that have been given here I is easily
shown to respect E and E On the other hand it
does not respect E
In fact there can be no invariant in the presence of
E an attempt to construct one led to the discovery
of an attack where n
C
is a nonce which the intruder
can generate
A  B  p
B
n
A
 A
B   I A  p
A
n
A
 n
B

I B  A  p
A
n
A
 n
B
 n
C

A  I B  p
B
n
B
 n
C

I A  B  p
B
n
B

This run establishes the possibility that A takes n
B
 n
C
to be B s nonce challenge and so B s completion of
the protocol does not provide authentication that A
received B s nonce challenge B 
 Discussion
In this paper we have shown how the theory of CSP
might be specialised to provide a theory for reason
ing about authentication protocols The process of
veri	cation requires the assumptions about encryption
mechanisms and about the capability of a hostile agent
to be made explicit The theory includes a CSP model
of the framework containing the protocol rules for es
tablishing authentication of messages within a single
agent and a general theorem for deducing authentica
tion between agents from their properties with respect
to an invariant on messages together with rules for
deriving the required properties
We 	nd that construction of the invariant predicate
forces consideration of the precise reasons why a pro
tocol is expected to work In this respect it should
reect the understanding of the protocol designer and
make this understanding precise and explicit Failed
attempts to construct an invariant may also provide
insight as to why a protocol does not provide authen
tication Use of a weak encryption mechanism which
allows km
 
 m

  km
 
 km

 would not provide au
thentication as stated in Section  and the diculty
in 	nding the invariant may lead to the discovery of
the attack as indeed happened here
The CSP language in common with other process alge
bras such as CCS provides a language suitable for the
description of protocols in a natural way Abadi and
Gordon  observe that this kind of approach combines
a precise and solid foundation for reasoning about pro
tocols together with a clear relationship to implemen
tations
Another bene	t of the process algebra approach is to
identify precisely the authentication property required
of a protocol This may be left vague in the original
formulation of the protocol and performing the veri
	cation often gives information as to which properties
actually hold as well as pinning down precisely the
properties which are provided by the protocol The vi
tal question as to whether the properties obtained are
indeed those required are beyond the scope of the for
mal analysis itself and must really be assessed accord
ing to the intended use of the protocol Security prop
erties may be captured as CSP speci	cations or al
ternatively in terms of equivalences between processes
as is done in  where a network built using the pro
tocol is required to be equivalent to a network which
describes the e
ect of a correct operation of the proto
col equivalence means that the protocol must operate
correctly that no context written in the process alge
bra can distinguish between the actual protocol and its
speci	cation
Comparison with other approaches
The CSP approach put forward by this author in
 advocated the encapsulation of required proper
ties in terms of the interactions between the protocol
agents and their users The intention is to separate
out the required properties from the way of imple
menting them Since a property of a system should
be described in terms of its possible interactions with
its environment the internal events trans i and rec i
should not appear in the property description This
approach requires extra events such as A connect to B
and B  authenticated  A to appear in the protocol de
scription as captured in USER
A
and USER
B
 The de
scriptions might then be as follows
USER
A
 a connect toi  
trans Ai p
i
n
A
 A 
rec A ip
A
n
A
 x  i 
trans Ai p
i
x   Stop
USER
B
 rec B  Ap
B
y  A 
trans B ap
A
y  n
B
 
rec Bi  p
B
n
B
 
B  authenticated  A  Stop
Our top level requirement would be that
NET n trans  rec sat
B  authenticated  A authenticates A connect to B
The essential proof strategy will remain that proposed
in this paper but the highlevel description of the prop
erty will be purely in terms of the interactions between
the network and its environment The proof rules will
remain unchanged though there will be an additional
assumption required that messages not meeting the in
variant I are not introduced to protocol agents by the
environment this was guaranteed when such agents
had no channels apart from trans and rec
The approach of including additional control events
into a protocol description is appropriate both for ab
stracting away the details of the protocol description
and also for providing a clearer understanding of what
the protocol designer is attempting to achieve This
separation of concerns allows authentication speci	
cations to be formulated independently of the details
of any particular protocol External events are intro
duced in other CSP approaches to protocol analysis
  and elsewhere  In the case of the anal
ysis performed here additional external events such
as A nonce challenge OK  B and A last message B
might be included to make 	ner distinctions between
di
erent avours of authentication This approach is
simply an straightforward extension of the approach
we have in fact taken in this paper introducing spe
cial events are introduced to mark particular points in
the run of the protocol which we have been pinpointing
directly
Another issue of interest is that De	nition  is not
concerned with matching up occurrences of events from
T and R once some event from R has occurred then
this de	nition allows arbitrarily many events from T
to occur without breaking authentication Lowe 
discusses a stronger version of authentication which re
quires each authenticating event to correspond to a dif
ferent authenticated event#he terms this requirement
injectiveness Such a property is important for exam
ple in the authorisation of 	nancial transactions This
property can be captured by strengthening the above
de	nition as follows
Denition 
T injectively authenticates R b
%tr  R  %tr  T 
 
If T injectively authenticates R then it follows
immediately that T authenticates R since if tr  R 
hi then %tr  R   and so %tr  T    and thus
tr  T  hi
The techniques developed in this paper are concerned
only with noninjective authentication Their exten
sion to deal with injectiveness is an area of ongoing
research
This approach contrasts with that taken in  
where speci	cations are what Roscoe calls intensional
requiring that the protocol works as expected in some
sense Such properties cannot be expressed as CSP
speci	cations independently of the protocol itself and
they really correspond to a recipe for providing the
speci	cation appropriate to the particular protocol
For example Gollmann identi	es a number of authenti
cation properties in  the one closest to those we have
considered here is G which states that !the origin of
all messages in the protocol has to be authenticated"
We would treat this as a conjunction of authentication
properties r authenticating s r authenticating s
and r authenticating s stipulating that authentica
tion is required only when the protocol run is com
plete Other examples are given in  which gives
the canonical intensional speci	cation as one where
the interleavings of messages at di
erent agents are in
accordance with the messages in the protocol and a
slightly weaker on in  which requires that when
ever a participant completes its part of a protocol run
then the other participant must have engaged in the
sequence of events described by the protocol These
intensional properties can be formulated for any par
ticular protocol but not in CSP terms independently
of any protocol They correspond to recipes for pro
ducing a speci	cation appropriate for a given protocol
A di
erent process algebraic approach is taken by
Abadi and Gordon  where the picalculus  is
extended to the spi calculus to model encryption
The resulting language allows protocols to be described
in a straightforward way the treatment of freshness
of nonces and keys is more explicitly provided by the
process description language itself encapsulation with
the  operator provides a natural and pleasing model
of nonce and key generation Correctness of a proto
col is established by showing that it is testing equiv
alent to a speci	cation process that describes explic
itly what the protocol is intended to achieve In other
words they are indistinguishable in any context As
a result the enemy does not have to be modelled ex
plicitly The capabilities of the enemy are precisely
those that can be described within the spi calculus lan
guage a context distinguishing between protocol and
its speci	cation would describe an attack on the pro
tocol and conversely if no context distinguishes them
then the protocol implements the speci	cation in the
context of any enemy which may be described in the
spi calculus This contrasts with the approach taken
in this paper where the speci	cation is separated to
some extent from the protocol and which allows 	ner
distinctions to be drawn between di
erent notions of
authentication The explicit description of the enemy
allows analysis with regard to di
erent enemy capabil
ities within the same framework More comparative
examples are required to explore the relative merits of
each approach
The approach of providing an invariant I as the core of
a proof is complementary to the tools based approaches
    which search for attacks The results of
the latter kind of analysis provides useful information
as to why a protocol is not correct or alternatively
gives a bald statement that no attack can be found
This is appropriate for debugging but does not pro
vide understanding as to why a protocol is correct It
is a claim of this paper that the invariant provides the
basis for such an understanding and it might be prof
itable to explore the interplay between the state explo
ration approaches and proofs One problem concerns
the relationship between the 	nite nature of the state
space and the in	nite possibilities for attacks such as
arise from such aspects as the possibility of arbitrary
depths of encryption and combining of messages and
Lowe  has begun to consider a proof strategy based
on the general form of a protocol run for establishing
when the absence of an attack on a 	nite state space
really does imply that no attack is possible on the in	
nite state space It seems that the invariant approach
might also be useful in this context
Paulson  has investigated the application of the
proof tool Isabelle HOL to proving security properties
of protocols He speci	es security protocols in terms
of traces of the system as a whole The rounds of a
protocol are translated into rules about how system
traces may be augmented Possible enemy activities
also become rules Once all of the rules have been
identi	ed the aim is to prove that any system trace
that can be generated using the rules must meet the
required property this is established by induction He
does not use an explicit invariant but he also aims
to prove that particular messages can never occur in
a trace and this requires certain lemmas establishing
that particular classes of message cannot occur This is
also a feature of the approach taken in  which ap
plies language theory to establish that particular terms
cannot be generated using given production rules Me
chanical assistance for proofs is invaluable and Paulson
has some useful results concerning reusability of proof
strategies It appears that a number of protocols have
proofs of a similar shape which allows ecient analysis
of new protocols Recent work on providing mechanical
assistance to the CSP proofs using PVS  is encour
aging but at present
 
it is still necessary to provide the
invariant in order for the proof to proceed so analysis
 
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of fresh protocols will not be as automatic as Paulson
reports for Isabelle HOL
Other approaches to direct proof of protocols rather
than the indirect route by establishing absence of at
tacks tend to be based on formal languages for de
scribing security properties together with rules which
support reasoning about statements in the language
Protocols are modelled as rules which allow the deriva
tion of new statements from existing ones The best
known example of such a language is the BAN logic
 though the need for idealisation of protocols into
the logic means that the link between a protocol and
its logical treatment is informal The formal language
described in  contains lowerlevel primitives which
relate more directly to the steps taken by a protocol
and supports reasoning concerning the knowledge of
the intruder at particular stages This language is used
in conjunction with the NRL protocol analyser which
is used to check reachability of negated requirements
so it is closer to the tools based approaches However
an approach to proof reecting that presented in this
paper seems feasible
Future directions
This paper has presented an approach to analysing and
verifying authentication protocols driven in part by
consideration of the NeedhamSchroeder protocol The
veri	cation was done by hand and the cryptographic
mechanisms considered are straightforward nonces
and publickey encryption There is an obvious need to
investigate the CSP handling of other security mech
anisms such as timestamps and to investigate more
complicated protocols Other security properties such
as con	dentiality should also be investigated It seems
likely that the same approach will apply to con	dential
ity properties since such properties may be expressed
in terms of unreachability
Some form of mechanical assistance for proof appears
feasible and this would bring bene	ts in managing the
details of the proofs which can become cumbersome to
track A theory based around the rules given in the
paper has now been described in the theorem prover
PVS  and investigations are continuing into the
assistance that can be provided into 	nding the invari
ant
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